What Are the Key Economic Challenges Facing the Middle East?
In January 2009 the BBC ran a story detailing the fragile economy of Dubai and how it had been severely affected by the global recession (BBC News, January 22nd 2009). Unsurprisingly sensationalist in nature, I saw beyond this story which at the time could so easily have been reapplied to almost any other modern city or country in the world. I noticed that it was one of the few economic stories pertaining to the Middle East that was ever carried by major international news broadcasters which was not specifically about oil. I realised that unless an energy crisis had hit, was about to hit, or would possibly hit, then very few people seemed interested in the economy of the Middle East. If one then investigates further into history, the region has always been considered as geopolitically crucial, yet the ‘stagnant economy’ as described by Thomas Friedman’s seminal book “The Lexus and the Olive Tree” has often been acknowledged, and yet merely accepted as a de facto element to world order. As a result, it is unsurprising that the Middle East has been labelled as being “markedly underdeveloped” in comparison to many other regions (Kuran, 2004). However, although it seems often overlooked, the stability of the world does indeed depend on economic trends in the Middle East; not solely for energy prices, but also in for things such as inhibiting radicalism or indeed terrorism.
Throughout this essay I will establish the major obstacles to economic stability and prosperity facing the contemporary Middle East. I will take the examples of both a rentier state and a non-rentier state – Bahrain and Egypt respectively – in order to highlight such challenges. Whilst of course some problems identified in Egypt for example may not be equally applied to all states, Egypt’s size and diverse economic shape (and distinct stagnation) is a decent representative for most non-rentier states in the region. With regards rentier states, most function with a similar economic model and face similar challenges. Therefore Bahrain is a fairly representative country for many of the rentier states in the Middle East. With the use of these two countries in order to represent the wider Middle East, this will enable me to present the argument that a multitude of challenges have led to economic underdevelopment which has left many states (non-rentier) of the Middle East behind most other regions in the world. In the case of Egypt, I would argue that a cyclical system of economic stagnation and migration of educated classes, coupled with lack of workable reform of the private sector leads to a spiral of either slow growth or genuine decline. I will highlight how the current system is overwhelmed by an already large population and will show that if current trends continue, Egypt, along with most other non-rentier states in the Middle East are faced with a dismally impecunious future. With regards to rentier states, I will propose the argument that lack of diversification and a consequential reliance on a single commodity may have led to short term economic strength. However, without diversification the future economic strength will truncate markedly quite soon.
The first part of this essay concerns Egypt, which until the early nineties had maintained a long standing socialist economic model. Enjoying a relatively diverse economy, Egypt not only relies heavily on agriculture and crop export but also has significant energy resources (9% of the GDP). Egypt also enjoys the financial benefits of tourism which accounts for approximately 10% of the GDP. Egypt’s economy only developed as it has due to the reforms of 1991 when Mubarak moved the country from its socialist model to that of a capitalist structure (Löfgren 1993). When Mubarak moved from a Socialist Economic structure to that of Capitalism his fundamental reform effectively widened the private sector by privatising previously state-owned and state-controlled services. This was to have the overall aim of improving the economic situation for Egyptians by fostering “efficient competitive economic circuits” (Kenawy, 2009). This reform was rather successful and Egypt saw its comparatively diverse economy increase with a steady GDP growth of an average of 4.53% between 1991 and 2008 (World Bank WDI, 2008). Although growth was sometimes greater prior to the reforms, it was also very limited in other years. Nowadays Egypt’s economy enjoys consistent and reliable growth. With the fact that positive steps have been introduced and have been proven to be effective, one would anticipate a positive future for Egypt. This is very much the impression given by Rachid Mohammed Rachid (Egyptian Minister for Trade and Industry) during an interview with renowned Al-Jazeera correspondent Riz Khan. Rachid briefly acknowledged some shortfalls in the economy, but focussed almost exclusively on the positive impact the reforms had made and would continue to make (Khan & Rachid, 2008). However I would strongly suggest that the reality is far from positive, and compels many commentators, including the much distinguished and award winning Egyptian economist Aladdin Elaasar to suggest that the Egyptian economy is “in trouble” with the potential for “profound social ramifications” (Elaasar, 2009).
The social ramifications about which Elaasar speaks refer to a growing number of disenfranchised young males who face a future blighted by a lack of employment in the country. Indeed the unemployment rate in Egypt among 15-24 year old males is a staggeringly high 23% as of 2005 (World Bank Data, 2005). These problems in isolation of course do not necessarily infer economic ruin. However, they do provoke further trends which tend to exacerbate existing economic difficulties. In very broad terms, labour migration from a developing country tends to create a paradox – on one hand it is beneficial, and on the other it is damaging. The key difference is whether the migrant worker is skilled or unskilled. Unskilled labour migration can reduce the strain on the economy, and consequently reduce the rate of unemployment. Furthermore, unskilled migrants will often send money back to their home country to family members. This trend is, in general terms, beneficial to a developing but fragile economy. A demographic of young males who would otherwise be underemployed or unemployed and thus a burden on the economy suddenly becomes an economic and political asset with little or no expense for the state. The case of Egypt is not very different to that of many other developing countries – particularly in the Middle East. There is however one huge flaw to its migration trends which not only undermines the positive effects of labour migration, but in reality makes it a crippling problem for the country.
According to a survey conducted by Dr Talani of UCLA in 2005, of all migrant workers to leave Egypt, mainly for Europe or the US and Canada, 47.6% are degree holders or hold post-graduate qualifications. Although falling short of western standards of a ‘welfare state’, it is still rather prosaic to suggest that from birth to completion of university, this portion of society are an economic encumbrance on the country. Theoretically of course, they are an economic investment as the future business minds foster private sector growth, entrepreneurs develop international trade, and doctors and teachers provide a high standard of public service. Unfortunately, the reality facing the Egyptian government is plainly obvious; these degree holders simply leave for more prosperous lands thus exacerbating and perpetuating the cyclical problem of economic stagnation. Economic stagnation then leads to wide unemployment which in turn encourages people to leave. I would argue most vociferously that this is one of the fundamental challenges facing not just Egypt, but the majority of the non-rentier states in the Middle East.
The second major obstacle to prosperity facing Egypt is that of population growth. To highlight this I will draw upon Sirageldin (2003) who conducted a study which showed quite clearly that population growth at current trends will have a profoundly deleterious effect on the economic health of Egypt. The study showed three different possible trends of population growth which of course would produce three different results – a streamlined economy, a sluggish economy, or an utterly stagnated economy. These results were predicted as of 1994, however with the benefit of the last fifteen years to calculate which trend has actually happened, it produces a worrying result. At current trends based on population growth, the Egyptian economy will fall roughly in the middle between Sirageldin’s predictions of sluggish to stagnated economy with a population of over 140 million by 2045 (the threshold for utterly stagnated fell at 157 million people). So although nowadays the economy is suffering, and recent reforms have yet to have a tangible impact on the lives of the average Egyptian, such deterioration would of course exacerbate existing problems like migration of educated classes. This prediction is also readily and accurately applied to other non-rentier states throughout the Middle East. It seems that without major upheaval, the future falls somewhere between bleak and lugubrious for these countries.
Nevertheless, as is so often the case with the Middle East, the details are more complex and there is a distinctly dichotomous nature to the economic environment. Rentier states are states which rely heavily on one single commodity or a very small number of often interrelated commodities for economic prosperity. They are usually associated with rapid growth and rapid wealth, but the discovery of the commodity can also have a pejorative effect on internal stability. An obvious example would be the difference between Qatar and Nigeria, both of whom rely almost exclusively on export of energy resources. However, Qatar enjoys relative peace and incredible riches, whereas Nigeria suffers from an underreported internal conflict and widespread poverty .
Bahrain is a state which falls under the definition of a rentier state and enjoys comparative prosperity. However, even with this ostensible prosperity it is often very easy to overlook important issues. The economy is based on the single commodity of energy, and is therefore by default almost completely reliant on the global oil and gas price for economic growth. However, the issue is that although often financially beneficial, it can also be subject to massive volatility – when the oil price collapses, the economy of Bahrain suffers. This effect may seem simplistic, but applying a workable solution to oil price reliance is much less so, and very few rentier states have succeeded in doing so. Nevertheless, this is not the only problem facing Bahrain.
Although Bahrain, along with other oil-reliant states in the region, enjoys relative prosperity it is still affected greatly by unemployment (UN HDR 2009). Blighted by a high unemployment rate (although lower than Egypt) and the issue of population growth, Bahrain too will also face difficult challenges associated with a saturated labour market and consequential migration of educated classes. Bahrain is of course a richer country and therefore one would anticipate that the level of migration would fall short of that of Egypt. Nevertheless, it remains problematic in economic and socio-economic terms. However, this is not the largest worry of the country, and of course its oil-rich neighbours. The aforementioned volatility with global energy prices is one huge drawback to single commodity economic reliance, but it is not the most fundamental problem. Simply speaking, the oil will eventually run dry. In the case of Bahrain and many other rentier states, there have been concerted efforts to not only diversify the economy, but also to use revenue generated from oil more wisely by investing in oil stabilisation programs and the property market amongst other things (UN HDR 2009). Whilst this is evidently a positive move towards economic surety, it also exposes the economy to even more external risks as demonstrated by the ongoing fiscal crisis in Dubai following the global financial downturn. Nevertheless, diversification is a paramount necessity and certain conditions are required to achieve it; an efficient taxation system for example (many of the GCC countries have little or sometimes no system of taxation) and assurances against economically damaging events such as the global financial crisis (Fasano & Iqbal, 2003). Without such elementary reforms, Bahrain along with many other GCC countries will still remain speciously wealthy, but incredibly susceptible to collapse. Moreover, their source of income is finite.
As previously suggested, the Middle East is an economically dichotomous region. Yet both sides suffer from economic problems. Rentier states are currently experiencing a brighter time, yet they still face a problematic future unless serious reforms are introduced. Economic reliance on a single diminishing commodity accompanied by outdated taxation systems and the additional (although less prominent) problems such as population growth and labour migration all give rise to a certain future – a bleak one. Non-rentier states suffer from the more basic (but no more easily resolvable) problems associated with general stagnation – those of poverty, unemployment and migration of educated classes. This is greatly exacerbated by a rising population and if trends continue, Egypt’s future, like that of many other non-rentier states, also looks unavoidably abysmal.
References
Borthwick, M. (2009) Global Woes Hit Dubai’s Fragile Economy. BBC World News: Middle East Business [online] [accessed 03 May 2010] Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7839347.stm
Elassar, A. 2009 Is Egypt Stable? The Middle East Quarterly: Summer. [Online] 18(3), [Accessed 03 May 2010] pp69-75. Available at http://www.meforum.org/2413/is-egypt-stable
Friedman, T.L. (2000) The Lexus and the Olive Tree. New York: First Anchor Books Edition
Iqbal, Z. & Fasano, U. (2003) GCC Countries: From Oil Dependence to Diversification: International Monetary Fund
Kenawy, E.M . (2009) The Privatization’s Mechanisms and Methods in Egypt: Practical Cases. Journal of Applied Sciences Research [online] 5(4), [accessed 04 May 2010] Available at http://www.insipub.com/jasr/2009/420-442.pdf
Khan, R. (2008) Interview with Rachid Mohammed Rachid. [Online] [Accessed 04 May 2009] Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KKkV-SVTKGQ&feature=PlayList&p=2FC55787D3D78D06&playnext_from=PL&playnext=1&index=35
Kuran, T. (2004) Why the Middle East is Economically Underdeveloped: Historical Mechanisms of Institutional Stagnation. [Online] [Accessed 3 May 2009] p2. Available at http://www.international.ucla.edu/cms/files/kuran.0130.pdf
Löfgren, H. (1993) Economic Policy in Egypt: International Journal of Middle East Studies (25) pp407-421. Cambridge University Press
Sirageldin, I. (2003) Human Capital: Population Economics in the Middle East – American University In Cairo Press.
Talani, L.S. (2005) Globalisation, marginalisation and illegal Muslim migration to the EU: Out Of Egypt. [Online] [Accessed 5 May 2010] pp19-21. Available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/84t8q4p1
United Nations. (2009) United Nations Development Report: Middle East (2009) [Online] [Accessed May 5 2010] pp117-135. Available at http://www.arab-hdr.org/publications/other/ahdr/ahdr2009e.pdf
World Bank. (2009) Unemployment, youth male (% of male labour force ages 15-24).World Development Report 2009. [Online] [Accessed 4 May 2010] Available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.MA.ZS
Friday, May 7, 2010
Wednesday, April 14, 2010
Gaza - Israel's Headache
The Gaza strip is some twenty eight miles long and three miles wide, yet this small area of land has cost thousands of lives and remains one of the most contentious areas on Earth. Home to over 1.5 million Palestinians, the current situation there has been described as one of the worst ongoing humanitarian crises the world has seen, and yet as abhorrent the situation is for the Palestinian population, I would still describe it as equally damaging for those referred to as the oppressors. How can this be so? Undoubtedly there are rockets fired from the Gaza strip. The captured soldier Gilad Shalit remains tightly wrapped in the arms of Hamas who hold at least tentative control over the area. In response, the Israeli military, backed by overwhelming domestic support, launched its own rockets which were more numerous and much more deadly. Operation Cast Lead killed over fourteen hundred Palestinians, the majority of whom were civilians. However, the fury has already been unleashed on the Palestinians. The fury against the Israelis is yet to come.
The historical problem has always been rooted in territorial disputes and anti-Semitism alongside reciprocal hatred towards the Arabs. The attempts to resolve these issues has always included the use of military, paramilitary or resistance operations. Following Operation Cast Lead such resistance has dwindled. Now the only credible and utilised threat is that of rocket attacks aimed at towns within range. There is of course the constant threat of isolated suicide bombings but with the construction of the security "barrier" (which of course remains another point for debate) has reduced this threat and in recent years there have been no such attacks. Nevertheless, Israeli aggression remains, and most days see military action against supposed military targets. The fall out from such aggression lies not today, but tomorrow.
The demographics of the Gaza strip would be astonishingly worrying for any government wishing to shore up an economy of any significance, let alone for a government faced with the additional challenges Gaza presents. Over 40% of Palestinians living in Gaza are under the age of 16 and the unemployment rate for those of working age is at approximately 45% - the highest of any area on Earth. This means that there already stands a significant number of disgruntled fighting age males, frustrated both with the policy of the Israelis and of a domestic leadership who seem incapable of dealing with internal problems affecting them. This inevitably leads to splinter groups who again the Hamas leadership seems unwilling or unable to deal with. It is these groups who take violent action against Israel and most of the rocket attacks appear to originate from splinter groups such as Ansar As-Sunna or Islamic Jihad.
The inability of Hamas to deal with this internal split seems to be a political own goal of catastrophic proportions. As long as they keep firing rockets Israel will continue its own aggression as well as the genocidal blockade of Gaza. Moreover, such action will be justified in the eyes of Israeli citizens, the majority of whom seem more than happy to see Palestinians suffer in the name of Homeland protection.
This of course raises the question of why Israel would choose an outdated form of warfare in the siege of Gaza. Effectively this siege is tantamount to sanctions at a level which would never be granted by the UN. Recently Israel banned the import of cooking gas into the area, which seems to be nothing more than a blatant act of cruelty. Gaza is clinging onto a struggling joyless existence and arguably suffers more terror than any region of its controversial neighbour, including Sderot which remains one of the most attacked places in the world. Indeed, Hamas was elected in what seemed like quasi-democratic elections, and it is an undeniable fact that Israel would benefit from a regime change. Sanctions have this overall aim. In this case, sanctions would not work fast enough as they are designed to be damaging but rarely critically destructive. The blockade however achieves the latter.
The blockade to this unprecedented level has been in force since 2007. In that time, Hamas have remained in power despite a comparatively minor conflict with Fatah. Nevertheless, the Gazan people cannot remain under such pressure, and it is this pressure which is inevitably destined to be transferred onto what appears to be a weak government as the suffering population begs for solutions. The problem for the future arises when those 40% of youngsters reach fighting age. Half of this demographic are of course female, and although there has been a number of incidents of female suicide bombings, the most worrying portion is that of the 20% of males. In five years time, one third of these males will reach fighting age, will be politically aware, will have grown up in the "Culture of Death" (as so aptly described by Ami Pedahzur) and will number an astonishing one hundred thousand - the size of the British Army. They will have access to weapons, they will be radicalised and will have lived during a time most likely to provoke hatred towards their neighbours. Half will be unemployed and will most likely be unmarried. They will also be guided by a government incapable and unwilling to calm their anger. I would therefore propose that there will be an intensification of pressure on the Hamas leadership to deal with the internal problems blighting the Gaza Strip, most of which stems from the Israeli blockade. In the meantime, Israel will also be unable to lift the siege for fear of opening the floodgates for attacks. Moreover, international pressure to lift the blockade seemingly falls on deaf ears, and internal support for aggressive action against Palestinians is widespread among Israeli voters.
Hamas have been engaged in resistance operations intermittently against Israel since its split from Fatah. They do not recognise Israel as a legitimate state and are considered as a terrorist organisation by most developed nations. Backed into a corner already, the pressure on the leadership is destined to grow. One must therefore question what the breaking point is. Will this be regime change through an Israeli backed internal uprising or will the breaking point have wider consequences? I suspect that rather than relinquish leadership, Hamas would opt for the latter. In knowing that the one common goal of those likely to attempt to overthrow them; that of the destruction of Israel and liberation of the Palestinian people, it would be much easier to opt for launching a third intifada.
A crocodile can bite down with ferocious force and tear the limbs from its prey with little effort. However, to hold its mouth closed requires negligible force, and in doing so its ability to bite vanishes. If you hold its mouth closed for years and allow it bare essentials for survival, the crocodile will still grow large and so will its teeth. The problem is, you must eventually let go at some point, and the angered and hungry reptile will inevitably bite. This bite however will be of an unprecedented nature. In five years time, Gaza will bite, and this inescapable fact will give the government of Israel a migraine of epic proportions.
*Opinion Blog - this means that there are no references other than those used for statistical purposes.
The historical problem has always been rooted in territorial disputes and anti-Semitism alongside reciprocal hatred towards the Arabs. The attempts to resolve these issues has always included the use of military, paramilitary or resistance operations. Following Operation Cast Lead such resistance has dwindled. Now the only credible and utilised threat is that of rocket attacks aimed at towns within range. There is of course the constant threat of isolated suicide bombings but with the construction of the security "barrier" (which of course remains another point for debate) has reduced this threat and in recent years there have been no such attacks. Nevertheless, Israeli aggression remains, and most days see military action against supposed military targets. The fall out from such aggression lies not today, but tomorrow.
The demographics of the Gaza strip would be astonishingly worrying for any government wishing to shore up an economy of any significance, let alone for a government faced with the additional challenges Gaza presents. Over 40% of Palestinians living in Gaza are under the age of 16 and the unemployment rate for those of working age is at approximately 45% - the highest of any area on Earth. This means that there already stands a significant number of disgruntled fighting age males, frustrated both with the policy of the Israelis and of a domestic leadership who seem incapable of dealing with internal problems affecting them. This inevitably leads to splinter groups who again the Hamas leadership seems unwilling or unable to deal with. It is these groups who take violent action against Israel and most of the rocket attacks appear to originate from splinter groups such as Ansar As-Sunna or Islamic Jihad.
The inability of Hamas to deal with this internal split seems to be a political own goal of catastrophic proportions. As long as they keep firing rockets Israel will continue its own aggression as well as the genocidal blockade of Gaza. Moreover, such action will be justified in the eyes of Israeli citizens, the majority of whom seem more than happy to see Palestinians suffer in the name of Homeland protection.
This of course raises the question of why Israel would choose an outdated form of warfare in the siege of Gaza. Effectively this siege is tantamount to sanctions at a level which would never be granted by the UN. Recently Israel banned the import of cooking gas into the area, which seems to be nothing more than a blatant act of cruelty. Gaza is clinging onto a struggling joyless existence and arguably suffers more terror than any region of its controversial neighbour, including Sderot which remains one of the most attacked places in the world. Indeed, Hamas was elected in what seemed like quasi-democratic elections, and it is an undeniable fact that Israel would benefit from a regime change. Sanctions have this overall aim. In this case, sanctions would not work fast enough as they are designed to be damaging but rarely critically destructive. The blockade however achieves the latter.
The blockade to this unprecedented level has been in force since 2007. In that time, Hamas have remained in power despite a comparatively minor conflict with Fatah. Nevertheless, the Gazan people cannot remain under such pressure, and it is this pressure which is inevitably destined to be transferred onto what appears to be a weak government as the suffering population begs for solutions. The problem for the future arises when those 40% of youngsters reach fighting age. Half of this demographic are of course female, and although there has been a number of incidents of female suicide bombings, the most worrying portion is that of the 20% of males. In five years time, one third of these males will reach fighting age, will be politically aware, will have grown up in the "Culture of Death" (as so aptly described by Ami Pedahzur) and will number an astonishing one hundred thousand - the size of the British Army. They will have access to weapons, they will be radicalised and will have lived during a time most likely to provoke hatred towards their neighbours. Half will be unemployed and will most likely be unmarried. They will also be guided by a government incapable and unwilling to calm their anger. I would therefore propose that there will be an intensification of pressure on the Hamas leadership to deal with the internal problems blighting the Gaza Strip, most of which stems from the Israeli blockade. In the meantime, Israel will also be unable to lift the siege for fear of opening the floodgates for attacks. Moreover, international pressure to lift the blockade seemingly falls on deaf ears, and internal support for aggressive action against Palestinians is widespread among Israeli voters.
Hamas have been engaged in resistance operations intermittently against Israel since its split from Fatah. They do not recognise Israel as a legitimate state and are considered as a terrorist organisation by most developed nations. Backed into a corner already, the pressure on the leadership is destined to grow. One must therefore question what the breaking point is. Will this be regime change through an Israeli backed internal uprising or will the breaking point have wider consequences? I suspect that rather than relinquish leadership, Hamas would opt for the latter. In knowing that the one common goal of those likely to attempt to overthrow them; that of the destruction of Israel and liberation of the Palestinian people, it would be much easier to opt for launching a third intifada.
A crocodile can bite down with ferocious force and tear the limbs from its prey with little effort. However, to hold its mouth closed requires negligible force, and in doing so its ability to bite vanishes. If you hold its mouth closed for years and allow it bare essentials for survival, the crocodile will still grow large and so will its teeth. The problem is, you must eventually let go at some point, and the angered and hungry reptile will inevitably bite. This bite however will be of an unprecedented nature. In five years time, Gaza will bite, and this inescapable fact will give the government of Israel a migraine of epic proportions.
*Opinion Blog - this means that there are no references other than those used for statistical purposes.
Wednesday, February 3, 2010
Why was Pre-Islamic Arabia Known as the Age of Ignorance
In answering this question I believe that it is a primary requirement to examine the linguistic aspect of the term which the Islamic world now utilises to refer to the time of Pre-Islamic Arabia. The term jahiliyya is the word used. Broadly translated as the age of ignorance it is a word which connotes a lack of morality and reflects the tribal, lawless and often confused state of Pre-Islamic Arabia, one which was corrupted by “unbelief and hypocrisy” (Koran: 9.97). It is also of important note that the root letters in colloquial Iraqi dialect for example lend themselves to a meaning surrounding the idea of “infancy” or “children”. I would argue that this could act as a semantic analogy to the societal, sociological and religious nature of pre-Islamic Arabia when juxtaposed with the characteristics of that which followed.
During this essay I will attempt to describe the political systems (or lack thereof in most part) as well as the cultural and social features present before the rise of Islam. This in itself presents problems due to the lack of credible sources from the time, a view shared by Hitti (1937) and later by Brown (2003) who claims that understanding pre-Islamic society is “hobbled by a dearth of historical sources”. However, in spite of this, I will argue that the term Jahiliyya is applied to Pre-Islamic Arabia, not because of the ignorant nature of their societal structure or lack of religious cohesion per se, but simply because Islam follows a system a contrario to that which preceded it.
In answering this question I believe that it is a primary requirement to examine the linguistic aspect of the term which the Islamic world now utilises to refer to the time of Pre-Islamic Arabia. The term jahiliyya is the word used. Broadly translated as the age of ignorance it is a word which connotes a lack of morality and reflects the tribal, lawless and often confused state of Pre-Islamic Arabia, one which was corrupted by “unbelief and hypocrisy” (Koran: 9.97). It is also of important note that the root letters in colloquial Iraqi dialect for example lend themselves to a meaning surrounding the idea of “infancy” or “children”. I would argue that this could act as a semantic analogy to the societal, sociological and religious nature of pre-Islamic Arabia when juxtaposed with the characteristics of that which followed.
During this essay I will attempt to describe the political systems (or lack thereof in most part) as well as the cultural and social features present before the rise of Islam. This in itself presents problems due to the lack of credible sources from the time, a view shared by Hitti (1937) and later by Brown (2003) who claims that understanding pre-Islamic society is “hobbled by a dearth of historical sources”. However, in spite of this, I will argue that the term Jahiliyya is applied to Pre-Islamic Arabia, not because of the ignorant nature of their societal structure or lack of religious cohesion per se, but simply because Islam follows a system a contrario to that which preceded it.
A key feature of Pre-Islamic Arabia is the lack of overall social cohesion which is probably a by-product of the nomadic lifestyle required for survival in a relatively inhospitable environment. Due to a distinct lack of overall authority as seen later with the Islamic ummah, and as a result a complete lack of common law, tribal law (which differed even from tribe to tribe) was the doctrine of order for the region. Although there were the “settled folk” (Hitti. 1937, pp. 23) they did not introduce a common law, to which the masses, both settled and nomadic followed. As a result, tribes were rather Machiavellian in nature and conducted raids on neighbouring tribes as a means to gain wealth and prominence in a particular geographical area. Raiding was seen as an essential way of life for tribes and as the pre-Islamic poet Qatami writes “our business is to make raids on the enemy, on our neighbour and on our brother, in case we find none to raid but a brother” (Hitti. 1937, pp. 25). The inevitable consequence to such a way of life as quite sharply described by Qatami was that of an almost constant state of local conflicts often lasting years. However, this state of constant anarchy underpinned what was in essence a rich and diverse culture.
The introduction of Islam to this region saw a fundamental shift in religious practices. The advent of Islam preached the basic premise of monotheistic worship which was in direct contrast to that seen previously. Polytheism and fetishist worship was the religious mainstay of the region. This was however not without foundation, and as Berkey (2003) suggests, Pre-Islamic Arabia and surrounding regions had religious practices which were interconnected rather than specifically different. There also existed the belief of the ‘Supreme Being’ (Brelich 1958). However, worship and religious practices of this kind, that of deification of individuals and ascribing divine properties to idols was countered by the rise of Islam. Indeed, the Koran clearly states that the practice of polytheism (and moreover animism and fetishism) caused the community to be “without Light” (Al-Nur, 24:40). It is evident that with such a vehement opposition to polytheism as a core difference between that of Islam (indeed the first pillar of Islam is the testament that there is no god but Allah) it is clear that there is deep criticism of the pre-Islamic times. However, although there was deep seated idol worship throughout this age, this was not the fabric of society; that is to say, this did not provide a moral framework to maintain societal cohesion. Societal cohesion was a concept which on a broader scale was unnecessary for the survival of the tribe. However, the Arabian Peninsula was an important trading route and so with a dearth of religious guidance in the form of Islam, the area was sporadically controlled by tribal law. This provided the framework for justice in the region, and moreover was common law by which all tribal members must follow. This inevitably led to a tribal loyalty and a sense of belonging governing individual’s actions rather than that of divine law. This notion is firmly supported by Hitti (1937, pp. 26) who states that “no worse calamity could befall a Bedouin than to lose his tribal affiliation”.
However, it is important to note a few basic features of the region to understand the broader picture. Firstly the area was a trading route rather that a major producer of goods. It was a rather inhospitable place with little resources and despite being surrounded by two major superpowers, the Byzantine and Sassanid empires it was not invaded (Hitti. 1937) An exception to this may be that of a minor proxy war between the two regional giants in the form of a incursion and subsequent relinquishment of territory in Yemen in the 6th century, which saw the Byzantine backed Axum invade areas in the Himyarite Yemen, only to be ousted by a Sasanian backed force (Espositio, 1999). The fact that there were two major superpowers also meant that there was never the temptation for expansionism on the part of the Arabs. This of course would have required a much more developed system to organise, rather than a loosely connected group of tribes. Indeed, the status quo at the time was acceptable for the requirements of daily life. Moreover, being different to the system of Islam which followed it, this societal modus operandi, although interspersed with many localised conflicts, functioned to meet its requirements. Furthermore, Mecca prospered as a trade centre. However, with the rise of Islam, and subsequent spread, imposing wider common laws required infrastructure, which in turn required financing. Following the Prophet’s demise his successors embarked on policies of expansionism, driven by the word of God and the desire to spread Islam. This is a starkly contrasting situation to that seen previously, where expansion and dominance of others was confined to very much local regions. This then leads to the inevitable question of whether the term Jahiliyya is a fair reflection of the times preceding Islam, considering the difference in ambition between the two eras.
It has been established that Pre-Islamic times were driven by tribal law and doctrine, and the aims of these laws and doctrine were limited to survival, indeed Holt., et al (1970, pp. 3) assert that “His [the bedouin] life is a competitive struggle for existence”. Additionally, accrual of wealth was done so in a much more localised manner through ghazw or raiding. There did not exist the need or desire for expansion and these laws were functional within the given context. However, I firmly assert that the term ascribed to this time as the age of ignorance is to a degree unfairly justified simply due to its juxtaposition with the guidance provided by Islam. Although the literal meaning points towards a lack of social morality without guidance from God, it most definitely holds connotations which are deeply critical. Of course by modern standards and arguably by the standards which immediately followed, that of an Islam in its infancy, the tribal order witnessed in pre-Islamic Arabia was indeed barbaric to an extent. However, it was workable, yet receives vociferous condemnation within the Koran.
For example, Surah Al-Isra 17:31 and Surah Al-Anam 6:151 discuss the topic of female infanticide, and specifically condemn it as un-Islamic. However, although the epitome of barbarism, female infanticide was a common practice within pre-Islamic Arabia. But again, one is inclined to view this practice in such a way which neglects the wider context. If one reiterates the limited requirements of the time, that of survival, then although this practice was barbarous, it was a necessary evil for prosperity. Islam very much improved the rights of women, however, female infanticide is still widely practiced even in modern times throughout the Middle East, mainly for economic security (Gendercide case study Feb 2004). This practice alone shows that even with moral or divine guidance, the desire for survival and prosperity surpasses the need to adhere to Islamic teachings.
Indeed, I am inclined to suggest that the obstreperous criticisms of pre-Islamic practices, be them religious or societal are to a degree ethnocentric. The Koran implies that the behaviour displayed throughout the period of Jahiliyya was epitomised by brutality, barbarism and nefariousness due to a lack of moral guidance. “Whomever GOD deprives of light, will have no light” (Al-Nur 24:40) infers the notion of before (in darkness) and after. However, although this may be true by today’s standards (and one must question whether this is indeed a truism) it is possibly not so worthy of such staunch criticism when contextualised to encompass the limited requirements for a divine guidance at that time.
References
Berkey J. (2003) The Formation of Islam – Religion and Society in the Near East, 600-1800. Cambridge University Press.
Brelich A. (1958) Gli eroi greci. University of Rome Publications
Esposito J. (1999) Oxford History of Islam. Oxford University Press.
Gendercide (Feb 2004) Gendercide Watch Case Study: Female Infanticide. Youth Advocate Program (www.yapi.org/girlchild/)
Hitti P. (1937) History of the Arabs. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave.
Holt P., et al (1970) The Cambridge History of Islam, Volume 1. Cambridge University Press.
Koran – Al- Tawba (9:97), Al-Nur (24:40), Al-Isra (17:31), Al-Anam (6:151).
Thursday, January 21, 2010
What is the Problem with Democracy in the Middle East?
The concept of democracy in the Middle East has been a topic of discussion which has plagued academics for decades. The region itself is infinitely complex and aside from the very term “Middle East” being hugely controversial, the notion of democracy too is also incredibly capacious. During this essay I will be addressing the first two issues. This will require a degree of necessary generalisation. However, this does not serve to legitimise my arguments which would otherwise be undermined by more expanded explanations, but rather acts as a more simplistic platform on which to base them. Once this basis for discussion has been created it will enable me to present the argument that a multitude of factors have prevented the Middle East from adopting a democratic paradigm. I will argue that internal factors such as historical reluctance for change, unstable social, religious and economic features of the region have, as of now, been somewhat incompatible with democracy. Moreover, foreign policy displayed by external state actors (mainly that of the US), has also served to undermine the introduction of democracy in the region. This also presents the argument that although ostensibly engaging in a process of democracy promotion, the US has in truth adopted a realist approach to the Middle East and often supported undemocratic regimes to realise its own agenda.
It is first necessary to establish what exactly is meant by the term “Middle East”. This term was coined by an American naval officer Alfred Mahan in 1902. It is used to refer to the area previously known as the “Orient” and encompasses a vast region, including North Africa, the Levant region and the Arabian Peninsula, stopping at Iran which is often referred to as Persia. Moreover, some would even include Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. For the purposes of this essay I will make reference to the Middle East as being that region which would generally consider itself to be Arab, and which is united by common language, stretching from Morocco, across North Africa and into Arabia. Although not united by a shared language or Arab identity, I will also be including Iran and Israel in this term due to their geographical location and high importance in the region. This term will therefore refer to 19 countries.[1]
Nonetheless, applying the term “Middle East” to these countries is not done so lightly. It is applied with consideration for thinkers such as the late Edward Said, who argued that referring to the region as one monolithic and homogeneous body is done so with utter ignorance. In his seminal book ‘Orientalism’ (1978), Said argues that this term is not only ethnocentric – what is the Middle East the middle of? – but also asserts that each country has incredible differences in language, culture, religion, history and ethnology. Although these factors must therefore be taken into serious consideration when discussing the applicability of democracy in the Middle East, Said’s strong rhetoric will be respected selectively. His views have undoubtedly brought about a vast change in the approach to the Middle East however I find elements of his discourse too forceful. There is the requirement to study this complex region and to do so without considering his ideas would be counter-productive. Conjointly however, to approach the subject with unquestioning acceptance of his proposals would also be somewhat unproductive.
Secondly it is fundamentally necessary to establish what is meant when we discuss democracy. This in itself is incredibly complicated and so I will adopt the proposals by Schumpeter (1994) who reduced this concept to a single sentence – “The Common Good and the Will of the People”. If we analyse in more depth the meaning of this then we are faced with not simply an election between multiple candidates (although political pluralism is of course vital) but more a common consensus about the approach state leaders make with regards political decision making. Schumpeter alludes to those in power, who must implement the good will of the people. Furthermore he asserts that the official position of all cabinet ministers “is that in all departments the will of the people prevails”. However, he is also astute in noting the shortcomings of this system in that the elected representative is also unable to realise the will of all of his constituents. (pp 251).
To discuss the concept of democracy in the Middle East is far from easy. If I generalise that democracy is the will of the common people realised by appointed officials who hold that position via free and fair elections then this will be too vague. Shimon Peres, whilst speaking during the World Economic Forum in 2009, firmly voiced his view on the qualitative values of a democratic model. Speaking somewhat out of character he passionately laid out his firm beliefs regarding this system. He ardently asserted that democracy is not just “about one day of elections every four years.” He says that after the elections, acts of violence are not justified simply because they are carried out by a democratically elected authority (Hamas being the inferred party guilty of such abuses). He furthers his argument with the suggestion that democracy is a “Civilisation”. These are incredibly profound words. He is suggesting that democracy is not simply a system of free and fair elections, but that this system must provide freedom and fairness in all aspects of life, for example, human rights, civil liberties and freedom of press etc. Although there is no mention of the word ‘democracy’, this is most definitely inferred by the United Nations Charter. So aside from the “one day in four years”, democracy is a way of life. I would agree in most part to his suggestions and so this is the platform from which I will address its application to the Middle East.
Historically speaking, the Middle East as we know it is in its infancy since it was ruled by the Ottoman Empire. However, following lengthy periods of colonial occupation and subsequent status as mandated territories, by 1971, all countries had established independence (Milton-Edwards, 2006). Since this independence, the often volatile region has seen huge shifts in political rule. Indeed, in eleven countries of the nineteen, there have been twenty one coups since World War Two. Contemporarily, Freedom House, an American independent NGO which promotes freedom worldwide, compiled their latest report, the findings of which place all nineteen countries as being not free, or partly free; the overwhelming majority the former(Freedom in the World, 2009). There are a significant number of reasons which lead to this lack of freedom. For example, many would argue that the dominant religion for this region is incompatible with the democratic system. Although there is a degree of truth to this statement, it is somewhat sweeping and must be scrutinised.
Firstly, Islam is a religion which focuses on the unaltered worship of God. He is considered by followers to be the sovereign of all men on Earth. This fundamental belief held by Muslims is intrinsic to understanding why the process of democracy may not be easily applied to this region. If God is the unequivocal voice on how all men should act, then it removes the right of adherents to make their own decisions regarding many aspects of their way of life. However, this methodology does not explain the varying degrees of freedom in the differing countries throughout the Middle East. For example, despite being a lower-developed country, Yemen is described as being a “partly free” nation by Freedom House. Yemen is similar in religious terms to its much more developed neighbour Oman, which is described as being “not free”. Yemen however is a theocracy, whereas Oman is not. To find the explanation for this discrepancy in the assumption that Islamic theology is incompatible with democracy, one must look at the difference in religious interpretation.
Whilst God’s law is considered to be ‘uncorrupted’, there is the need for its implementation on Earth by a legislative body. To that end, I would suggest that the problem in adopting democracy simply due to religion is not a valid argument. If the public wish for a legislator who will impose the will of God on the masses, then there is no reason why this cannot be done so with a democratic model. This is a view shared by El Fadl (2004) who suggests that God gave “considerable latitude” to humans in governing themselves, and that the Koran simply preaches a “minimum moral standard” by which Muslims must follow. This suggestion is important in that if humans may interpret what these moral codes are, and the political approach to imposing them, then this therefore leaves room for a democratic paradigm. This of course would explain the difference of civil freedoms outlined by the Freedom House survey for 2009. However, if one further investigates this, it becomes clear that whilst theoretically this may be possible, this approach would still retain religious restrictions. The masses may vote for hardline Islamic governments, or they may elect more moderate governments in democratic elections. Nevertheless, the values proposed by God as the overarching sovereign are still adopted in policy making (particularly regarding the rule of law). It would therefore be, by default, only ever possible to apply at best a ‘quasi- democratic’ system.
Whilst this is true for the majority of states throughout the region, it is not necessarily a truism for all. Iraq is a country with an extreme history of undemocratic rule. Following independence in 1932, the country saw its ubiquitous number of incidents of coups and political unrest. The result of the chaos was the leadership of Saddam Hussein. During a twenty year rule, democracy was an unthinkable possibility under his dictatorship. However, Saddam secularised the government and all laws were not based on the doctrine laid out by the Koran. One would therefore assume that freedom from a religious code would make this a more liberal state. This of course was not the case, and Saddam became adept at political censorship and brutality. Indeed, to further complicate matters, theocratic countries also often utilise their position of power to oppress the masses. The first example of theocratic rule in Yemen is representative of this. In spite of its comparably favourable score in regards to freedom, Yemen still attracted vociferous criticism by the organisation “Human Rights Watch”. Yemen was described as being marred by “arbitrary arrests and disappearances” (HRW World Report 2009). The lack of democracy in both secular and religious states therefore leads me to the conclusion that although in some respects Islam holds several key concepts which may conflict with this paradigm, it does not play as significant a role as many would argue.
An alternative reason for the lack of democracy in the region encompasses the opposition view to Edward Said. He suggested that the West harbours deep seated suspicion to those countries to its East. Rudyard Kipling once wrote “East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet”. Whilst this cliché is very broad, Buruma & Avishahi (Occidentalism, 2002) assert that the East’s view of Western political ideal, i.e. democracy, is that it is somewhat destructive and often associated with political hegemony. Such deep seated suspicion of the West by the Middle East makes the introduction of a political model developed and promoted by the “other” incredibly difficult from the outset. However, I would suggest that although there has traditionally been a suspicious attitude from that of the East towards the West, this does not serve as comprehensive reasoning behind the reluctance to embrace the democratic model. Indeed, many throughout the Middle East do rebel against oppression and hold the higher values ascribed to democracy such as freedom of speech as preeminent requirements to liberty in their lives. An example of this would be the recent increase in civil non-violent protest in Egypt (Lynch 2008). Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that many of the state systems in place suffer from historical hangovers which are a by-product of colonialism. Although not comprehensive in explaining major drawbacks to such political typologies, it is a fact acknowledged by Milton-Edwards (2006), who suggests that “the political traditions are not indigenous to the region” and are a “product of foreign domination”. Although holding a degree of truth, I would assert that the legacy left by colonial powers has, in contemporary political life, only served as a minimal influencing factor to prevent democracy growth.
However, the theory of internal barriers to democracy acceptance only paints part of the picture. The term “democracy acceptance” is not used accidentally. It implies that where there is acceptance, or lack thereof, there is proposal. This proposal is clearly manifested in US foreign policy. Historically, the US had always taken the approach of cooperation with states in the Middle East in order to meet their own agenda. There was a reluctance to interfere with internal policies provided that they did not significantly interfere with the US interests for that specific state. With the exceptions of often volatile relationships with Saddam Hussein’s regime and post-revolution Iran, the US cooperated with “undemocratic and autocratic” governments (HoC 2006). This was mainly for the security of energy requirements. A key piece of evidence to support this claim is the intimate relationship between the US and a very undemocratic Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is the largest oil producing nation and the US is the biggest consumer. Close diplomatic and economic ties with Saudi Arabia ensured this relationship and therefore the energy deals remained mutually beneficial. Relationships of this ilk, although not considered as close, were also maintained with Iran prior to the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Iran, ruled by the Shah was also undemocratic. However, in acts which became synonymous with US double standards, the Shah seized power in a CIA backed military coup of 1953 which ousted a democratically elected leader in Mossadegh (Hornberger 2005). The Shah was seen as pro-US and so was a much more attractive candidate in the eyes of the USA to safeguard the third largest oil reserve in the world. During the Iranian Revolution some 25 years later, the Shah was again backed by the US – in spite of huge numbers of Iranians supporting his opposition. The realist approach to this region displayed by the US has been a feature of their foreign policy for decades. However, a fresh approach in the form of George W Bush would apparently aim to end tyranny, ostensibly at the cost of US interests.
With the benefit of history, to understand US foreign policy in the Middle East, a comparison should be made with the democratisation of South America. This was done so with US backing (and military intervention). Indeed the US utilised a combination of hard and soft power, mainly the former, to achieve stable economies from which a number of democracies grew. Chile is an example cited by the economist Robert E. Looney (2005) to this end. A series of terrorist attacks as well as instability and volatility between the US and the oil giants of Iran and Iraq, led the US to decide to adapt long established US foreign policy to that of democracy promotion. Speciously, this approach would have been mutually beneficial – “a democratic world is a more peaceful world” (Haass 2002).The Bush administration’s increased intentions for democracy promotion utilised hard power against Iran and Iraq, to achieve this aim. The intervention in Iraq however attracts the most criticism. The naive reasoning of WMD, and then of links to terror, both of which remain unproven, served to undermine the legitimacy of the new approach. The retrospective party line from the Administration then alluded to democracy promotion to improve the lives of Iraqis. I am inclined to be incredibly sceptical for numerous reasons.
History has shown that US foreign policy is either realist or protectionist in nature. Moreover, the example cited earlier in the case of Iran serves to demonstrate that policies always favour US interests often at the expense of the masses – in the case of the Middle East, the main interest is energy security. Further evidence is realised when one compares the policies, and the deplorable intervention in Iraq with the approach taken with another oppressive regime – that of Saudi Arabia. In spite of the attacks of September 11th being heavily linked with Saudi Arabia (Not only does Osama Bin Laden hail from this country but also most of the Hijackers were Saudi too), the US were quick to show their support for the Saudi Royal Family. However, one would assume that the lack of democratic process as well as an increasing problem of Islamic extremism would provoke vociferous condemnation from the US for a country which is described as “not free” by the Freedom House survey (2009). Indeed, Human Rights Watch also described it as displaying behaviour which invokes “serious concerns” (HRW 2009) regarding human rights. However, aside from gentle rhetoric from the Whitehouse, which had little or no impact in promoting democracy, the Bush administration were unsurprisingly reserved in their approach. This moral double standard has been further displayed with the case of Egypt (again described as “not free”) where the regime in place were supported by the US Administration, and the opposition party of the Muslim Brotherhood were silenced by means of over-bureaucratisation and arbitrary detention during recent election periods. (Lynch 2008).
On reflection, the US foreign policy of democracy promotion is clearly selective. The states which received strong condemnation, sanctions, or indeed invasion, are those states (most notably Iran and Iraq) which had poor diplomatic ties with the US. Nations which are arguably as undemocratic but which hold energy resources and maintain diplomatic ties, such as Saudi Arabia or UAE, do not receive the same level of “help” in achieving democracy. Moreover, many of the oppressive regimes themselves receive US backing. The problem of promoting balanced democracy for each state in this region from the perspective of the US appears to be that when parties are elected which are “unacceptable” (HoC 2006 - when referring to the election of Hamas), simply speaking, the US may not get what it wishes for. I would therefore suggest that the US policy for democracy promotion is mainly an empty rhetoric which is marred by transparent double standards to satisfy its thirst for control in the region and ergo its oil reserves.
Although there is mountainous evidence to support such claims, it would be premature to make conclusive assumptions without consideration of evidence in defence of US foreign policy. This is in relation to rentier states prior to the attacks of September 11. Many of the GCC countries were offered financial assistance to be used for the promotion of democracy. However, most refused, and even the possible exception in the newly liberated Kuwait in 1991 soon realised that its reliance on the US for security against the Iraqi regime was outweighed by a growing sense of self confidence, backed by huge oil reserves. Kuwait, along with every other autocratic GCC country refused the carefully weighted pressure and negligible financial support from the US backed International Republican Institute. Nevertheless, it is widely acknowledged that in spite of this half-hearted coaxing, the US still favoured the status quo in most of the nations in that region. (Brown & Shahin 2009)
The naive attempts by the US in Iraq demonstrate how this complex region may not yet be ready for democracy. Simon Bromley (1994) clearly lays out preconditions for democracy, two defining features of which are the instigation of a capitalist economic model and privatisation of industry (mainly affecting rentier states). These prerequisites alone are not present in this region and are unlikely to be in the foreseeable future. Additionally, the aforementioned internal challenges faced by most states in the region also serve to at least slow down democratisation, and some would argue that they form a solid barrier to its growth. More strongly, I would argue that democracy cannot be introduced, but rather is simply a by-product borne of changing religious, social and economic pretexts present in the state. Moreover, it is a process which takes significant time as well as the cooperation of those already in power, who of course would have a vested interest in denying a fully democratic system. To attempt introduce democracy instantly, without such changes, would be tantamount to introducing a maimed zebra to a lioness, the consequences of which are clearly being demonstrated by the ongoing abomination in Iraq.
Timothy Reece
References & Bibliography
Bromley S. (1994) Rethinking Middle East Politics – Polity Press in Association with Blackwell Publishers
Brown J. & Shahin E. (2009) The Struggle over Democracy in the Middle East (pp 18-20) – Routledge Publications
Buruma I. & Avishahi A. (2004) Occidentalism – The West in the Eyes of its Enemies – Penguin Press
Milton-Edwards B. (2006) Contemporary Politics in the Middle East: Second Ed. – Polity Press
El Fadl K. (2004) Islam and the Challenge of Democracy – Princeton University Press
Freedom House (2009) Freedom in the World – Setbacks and Resilience [Accessed 22:48hrs 27/12/2009] - http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw09/MOF09_MENA.pdf http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=445
Haass R. (2002) Research Paper 06/54 – Democracy and the Middle East (pp 9) - House of Commons Library
Hornberger J. (2005) An Anti-Democracy Foreign Policy Plan: Iran – Future Freedom Foundation
House of Commons (2006) Research Paper 06/54 – Democracy and the Middle East (pp 1-12) - House of Commons Library
Human Rights Watch (2009) Human Rights Watch World Report 2009 (Saudi Arabia) [Accessed 17:55hrs 26/12/2009] - http://www.hrw.org/en/node/79258
Human Rights Watch (2009) Human Rights Watch World Report 2009 (Yemen) [Accessed 14:42hrs 26/12/2009] - http://www.hrw.org/en/node/79308
Lynch M. (2006) Project on Middle East Democracy – Egypt Today: The State of Human Rights (Part 3) [Accessed 15:46hrs 23/12/2009] - http://fora.tv/2008/09/10/Egypt_Today_State_of_Human_Rights#chapter_03
Peres S. (2009) World Economic Forum [Accessed 21:09hrs 22/12/2009] - (40 min 45 sec) - www.youtube.com/watch?v=cR4zRbPy2kY
Said E. (1978) Orientalism – Vintage Publications
Schumpeter J. (1994) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (pp 251) - Routledge Publications
United Nations (1945) United Nations Charter [Accessed 19:37hrs 21/12/2009] – http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/
[1]
Morocco, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Oman, Yemen.
It is first necessary to establish what exactly is meant by the term “Middle East”. This term was coined by an American naval officer Alfred Mahan in 1902. It is used to refer to the area previously known as the “Orient” and encompasses a vast region, including North Africa, the Levant region and the Arabian Peninsula, stopping at Iran which is often referred to as Persia. Moreover, some would even include Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. For the purposes of this essay I will make reference to the Middle East as being that region which would generally consider itself to be Arab, and which is united by common language, stretching from Morocco, across North Africa and into Arabia. Although not united by a shared language or Arab identity, I will also be including Iran and Israel in this term due to their geographical location and high importance in the region. This term will therefore refer to 19 countries.[1]
Nonetheless, applying the term “Middle East” to these countries is not done so lightly. It is applied with consideration for thinkers such as the late Edward Said, who argued that referring to the region as one monolithic and homogeneous body is done so with utter ignorance. In his seminal book ‘Orientalism’ (1978), Said argues that this term is not only ethnocentric – what is the Middle East the middle of? – but also asserts that each country has incredible differences in language, culture, religion, history and ethnology. Although these factors must therefore be taken into serious consideration when discussing the applicability of democracy in the Middle East, Said’s strong rhetoric will be respected selectively. His views have undoubtedly brought about a vast change in the approach to the Middle East however I find elements of his discourse too forceful. There is the requirement to study this complex region and to do so without considering his ideas would be counter-productive. Conjointly however, to approach the subject with unquestioning acceptance of his proposals would also be somewhat unproductive.
Secondly it is fundamentally necessary to establish what is meant when we discuss democracy. This in itself is incredibly complicated and so I will adopt the proposals by Schumpeter (1994) who reduced this concept to a single sentence – “The Common Good and the Will of the People”. If we analyse in more depth the meaning of this then we are faced with not simply an election between multiple candidates (although political pluralism is of course vital) but more a common consensus about the approach state leaders make with regards political decision making. Schumpeter alludes to those in power, who must implement the good will of the people. Furthermore he asserts that the official position of all cabinet ministers “is that in all departments the will of the people prevails”. However, he is also astute in noting the shortcomings of this system in that the elected representative is also unable to realise the will of all of his constituents. (pp 251).
To discuss the concept of democracy in the Middle East is far from easy. If I generalise that democracy is the will of the common people realised by appointed officials who hold that position via free and fair elections then this will be too vague. Shimon Peres, whilst speaking during the World Economic Forum in 2009, firmly voiced his view on the qualitative values of a democratic model. Speaking somewhat out of character he passionately laid out his firm beliefs regarding this system. He ardently asserted that democracy is not just “about one day of elections every four years.” He says that after the elections, acts of violence are not justified simply because they are carried out by a democratically elected authority (Hamas being the inferred party guilty of such abuses). He furthers his argument with the suggestion that democracy is a “Civilisation”. These are incredibly profound words. He is suggesting that democracy is not simply a system of free and fair elections, but that this system must provide freedom and fairness in all aspects of life, for example, human rights, civil liberties and freedom of press etc. Although there is no mention of the word ‘democracy’, this is most definitely inferred by the United Nations Charter. So aside from the “one day in four years”, democracy is a way of life. I would agree in most part to his suggestions and so this is the platform from which I will address its application to the Middle East.
Historically speaking, the Middle East as we know it is in its infancy since it was ruled by the Ottoman Empire. However, following lengthy periods of colonial occupation and subsequent status as mandated territories, by 1971, all countries had established independence (Milton-Edwards, 2006). Since this independence, the often volatile region has seen huge shifts in political rule. Indeed, in eleven countries of the nineteen, there have been twenty one coups since World War Two. Contemporarily, Freedom House, an American independent NGO which promotes freedom worldwide, compiled their latest report, the findings of which place all nineteen countries as being not free, or partly free; the overwhelming majority the former(Freedom in the World, 2009). There are a significant number of reasons which lead to this lack of freedom. For example, many would argue that the dominant religion for this region is incompatible with the democratic system. Although there is a degree of truth to this statement, it is somewhat sweeping and must be scrutinised.
Firstly, Islam is a religion which focuses on the unaltered worship of God. He is considered by followers to be the sovereign of all men on Earth. This fundamental belief held by Muslims is intrinsic to understanding why the process of democracy may not be easily applied to this region. If God is the unequivocal voice on how all men should act, then it removes the right of adherents to make their own decisions regarding many aspects of their way of life. However, this methodology does not explain the varying degrees of freedom in the differing countries throughout the Middle East. For example, despite being a lower-developed country, Yemen is described as being a “partly free” nation by Freedom House. Yemen is similar in religious terms to its much more developed neighbour Oman, which is described as being “not free”. Yemen however is a theocracy, whereas Oman is not. To find the explanation for this discrepancy in the assumption that Islamic theology is incompatible with democracy, one must look at the difference in religious interpretation.
Whilst God’s law is considered to be ‘uncorrupted’, there is the need for its implementation on Earth by a legislative body. To that end, I would suggest that the problem in adopting democracy simply due to religion is not a valid argument. If the public wish for a legislator who will impose the will of God on the masses, then there is no reason why this cannot be done so with a democratic model. This is a view shared by El Fadl (2004) who suggests that God gave “considerable latitude” to humans in governing themselves, and that the Koran simply preaches a “minimum moral standard” by which Muslims must follow. This suggestion is important in that if humans may interpret what these moral codes are, and the political approach to imposing them, then this therefore leaves room for a democratic paradigm. This of course would explain the difference of civil freedoms outlined by the Freedom House survey for 2009. However, if one further investigates this, it becomes clear that whilst theoretically this may be possible, this approach would still retain religious restrictions. The masses may vote for hardline Islamic governments, or they may elect more moderate governments in democratic elections. Nevertheless, the values proposed by God as the overarching sovereign are still adopted in policy making (particularly regarding the rule of law). It would therefore be, by default, only ever possible to apply at best a ‘quasi- democratic’ system.
Whilst this is true for the majority of states throughout the region, it is not necessarily a truism for all. Iraq is a country with an extreme history of undemocratic rule. Following independence in 1932, the country saw its ubiquitous number of incidents of coups and political unrest. The result of the chaos was the leadership of Saddam Hussein. During a twenty year rule, democracy was an unthinkable possibility under his dictatorship. However, Saddam secularised the government and all laws were not based on the doctrine laid out by the Koran. One would therefore assume that freedom from a religious code would make this a more liberal state. This of course was not the case, and Saddam became adept at political censorship and brutality. Indeed, to further complicate matters, theocratic countries also often utilise their position of power to oppress the masses. The first example of theocratic rule in Yemen is representative of this. In spite of its comparably favourable score in regards to freedom, Yemen still attracted vociferous criticism by the organisation “Human Rights Watch”. Yemen was described as being marred by “arbitrary arrests and disappearances” (HRW World Report 2009). The lack of democracy in both secular and religious states therefore leads me to the conclusion that although in some respects Islam holds several key concepts which may conflict with this paradigm, it does not play as significant a role as many would argue.
An alternative reason for the lack of democracy in the region encompasses the opposition view to Edward Said. He suggested that the West harbours deep seated suspicion to those countries to its East. Rudyard Kipling once wrote “East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet”. Whilst this cliché is very broad, Buruma & Avishahi (Occidentalism, 2002) assert that the East’s view of Western political ideal, i.e. democracy, is that it is somewhat destructive and often associated with political hegemony. Such deep seated suspicion of the West by the Middle East makes the introduction of a political model developed and promoted by the “other” incredibly difficult from the outset. However, I would suggest that although there has traditionally been a suspicious attitude from that of the East towards the West, this does not serve as comprehensive reasoning behind the reluctance to embrace the democratic model. Indeed, many throughout the Middle East do rebel against oppression and hold the higher values ascribed to democracy such as freedom of speech as preeminent requirements to liberty in their lives. An example of this would be the recent increase in civil non-violent protest in Egypt (Lynch 2008). Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that many of the state systems in place suffer from historical hangovers which are a by-product of colonialism. Although not comprehensive in explaining major drawbacks to such political typologies, it is a fact acknowledged by Milton-Edwards (2006), who suggests that “the political traditions are not indigenous to the region” and are a “product of foreign domination”. Although holding a degree of truth, I would assert that the legacy left by colonial powers has, in contemporary political life, only served as a minimal influencing factor to prevent democracy growth.
However, the theory of internal barriers to democracy acceptance only paints part of the picture. The term “democracy acceptance” is not used accidentally. It implies that where there is acceptance, or lack thereof, there is proposal. This proposal is clearly manifested in US foreign policy. Historically, the US had always taken the approach of cooperation with states in the Middle East in order to meet their own agenda. There was a reluctance to interfere with internal policies provided that they did not significantly interfere with the US interests for that specific state. With the exceptions of often volatile relationships with Saddam Hussein’s regime and post-revolution Iran, the US cooperated with “undemocratic and autocratic” governments (HoC 2006). This was mainly for the security of energy requirements. A key piece of evidence to support this claim is the intimate relationship between the US and a very undemocratic Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is the largest oil producing nation and the US is the biggest consumer. Close diplomatic and economic ties with Saudi Arabia ensured this relationship and therefore the energy deals remained mutually beneficial. Relationships of this ilk, although not considered as close, were also maintained with Iran prior to the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Iran, ruled by the Shah was also undemocratic. However, in acts which became synonymous with US double standards, the Shah seized power in a CIA backed military coup of 1953 which ousted a democratically elected leader in Mossadegh (Hornberger 2005). The Shah was seen as pro-US and so was a much more attractive candidate in the eyes of the USA to safeguard the third largest oil reserve in the world. During the Iranian Revolution some 25 years later, the Shah was again backed by the US – in spite of huge numbers of Iranians supporting his opposition. The realist approach to this region displayed by the US has been a feature of their foreign policy for decades. However, a fresh approach in the form of George W Bush would apparently aim to end tyranny, ostensibly at the cost of US interests.
With the benefit of history, to understand US foreign policy in the Middle East, a comparison should be made with the democratisation of South America. This was done so with US backing (and military intervention). Indeed the US utilised a combination of hard and soft power, mainly the former, to achieve stable economies from which a number of democracies grew. Chile is an example cited by the economist Robert E. Looney (2005) to this end. A series of terrorist attacks as well as instability and volatility between the US and the oil giants of Iran and Iraq, led the US to decide to adapt long established US foreign policy to that of democracy promotion. Speciously, this approach would have been mutually beneficial – “a democratic world is a more peaceful world” (Haass 2002).The Bush administration’s increased intentions for democracy promotion utilised hard power against Iran and Iraq, to achieve this aim. The intervention in Iraq however attracts the most criticism. The naive reasoning of WMD, and then of links to terror, both of which remain unproven, served to undermine the legitimacy of the new approach. The retrospective party line from the Administration then alluded to democracy promotion to improve the lives of Iraqis. I am inclined to be incredibly sceptical for numerous reasons.
History has shown that US foreign policy is either realist or protectionist in nature. Moreover, the example cited earlier in the case of Iran serves to demonstrate that policies always favour US interests often at the expense of the masses – in the case of the Middle East, the main interest is energy security. Further evidence is realised when one compares the policies, and the deplorable intervention in Iraq with the approach taken with another oppressive regime – that of Saudi Arabia. In spite of the attacks of September 11th being heavily linked with Saudi Arabia (Not only does Osama Bin Laden hail from this country but also most of the Hijackers were Saudi too), the US were quick to show their support for the Saudi Royal Family. However, one would assume that the lack of democratic process as well as an increasing problem of Islamic extremism would provoke vociferous condemnation from the US for a country which is described as “not free” by the Freedom House survey (2009). Indeed, Human Rights Watch also described it as displaying behaviour which invokes “serious concerns” (HRW 2009) regarding human rights. However, aside from gentle rhetoric from the Whitehouse, which had little or no impact in promoting democracy, the Bush administration were unsurprisingly reserved in their approach. This moral double standard has been further displayed with the case of Egypt (again described as “not free”) where the regime in place were supported by the US Administration, and the opposition party of the Muslim Brotherhood were silenced by means of over-bureaucratisation and arbitrary detention during recent election periods. (Lynch 2008).
On reflection, the US foreign policy of democracy promotion is clearly selective. The states which received strong condemnation, sanctions, or indeed invasion, are those states (most notably Iran and Iraq) which had poor diplomatic ties with the US. Nations which are arguably as undemocratic but which hold energy resources and maintain diplomatic ties, such as Saudi Arabia or UAE, do not receive the same level of “help” in achieving democracy. Moreover, many of the oppressive regimes themselves receive US backing. The problem of promoting balanced democracy for each state in this region from the perspective of the US appears to be that when parties are elected which are “unacceptable” (HoC 2006 - when referring to the election of Hamas), simply speaking, the US may not get what it wishes for. I would therefore suggest that the US policy for democracy promotion is mainly an empty rhetoric which is marred by transparent double standards to satisfy its thirst for control in the region and ergo its oil reserves.
Although there is mountainous evidence to support such claims, it would be premature to make conclusive assumptions without consideration of evidence in defence of US foreign policy. This is in relation to rentier states prior to the attacks of September 11. Many of the GCC countries were offered financial assistance to be used for the promotion of democracy. However, most refused, and even the possible exception in the newly liberated Kuwait in 1991 soon realised that its reliance on the US for security against the Iraqi regime was outweighed by a growing sense of self confidence, backed by huge oil reserves. Kuwait, along with every other autocratic GCC country refused the carefully weighted pressure and negligible financial support from the US backed International Republican Institute. Nevertheless, it is widely acknowledged that in spite of this half-hearted coaxing, the US still favoured the status quo in most of the nations in that region. (Brown & Shahin 2009)
The naive attempts by the US in Iraq demonstrate how this complex region may not yet be ready for democracy. Simon Bromley (1994) clearly lays out preconditions for democracy, two defining features of which are the instigation of a capitalist economic model and privatisation of industry (mainly affecting rentier states). These prerequisites alone are not present in this region and are unlikely to be in the foreseeable future. Additionally, the aforementioned internal challenges faced by most states in the region also serve to at least slow down democratisation, and some would argue that they form a solid barrier to its growth. More strongly, I would argue that democracy cannot be introduced, but rather is simply a by-product borne of changing religious, social and economic pretexts present in the state. Moreover, it is a process which takes significant time as well as the cooperation of those already in power, who of course would have a vested interest in denying a fully democratic system. To attempt introduce democracy instantly, without such changes, would be tantamount to introducing a maimed zebra to a lioness, the consequences of which are clearly being demonstrated by the ongoing abomination in Iraq.
Timothy Reece
References & Bibliography
Bromley S. (1994) Rethinking Middle East Politics – Polity Press in Association with Blackwell Publishers
Brown J. & Shahin E. (2009) The Struggle over Democracy in the Middle East (pp 18-20) – Routledge Publications
Buruma I. & Avishahi A. (2004) Occidentalism – The West in the Eyes of its Enemies – Penguin Press
Milton-Edwards B. (2006) Contemporary Politics in the Middle East: Second Ed. – Polity Press
El Fadl K. (2004) Islam and the Challenge of Democracy – Princeton University Press
Freedom House (2009) Freedom in the World – Setbacks and Resilience [Accessed 22:48hrs 27/12/2009] - http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw09/MOF09_MENA.pdf http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=445
Haass R. (2002) Research Paper 06/54 – Democracy and the Middle East (pp 9) - House of Commons Library
Hornberger J. (2005) An Anti-Democracy Foreign Policy Plan: Iran – Future Freedom Foundation
House of Commons (2006) Research Paper 06/54 – Democracy and the Middle East (pp 1-12) - House of Commons Library
Human Rights Watch (2009) Human Rights Watch World Report 2009 (Saudi Arabia) [Accessed 17:55hrs 26/12/2009] - http://www.hrw.org/en/node/79258
Human Rights Watch (2009) Human Rights Watch World Report 2009 (Yemen) [Accessed 14:42hrs 26/12/2009] - http://www.hrw.org/en/node/79308
Lynch M. (2006) Project on Middle East Democracy – Egypt Today: The State of Human Rights (Part 3) [Accessed 15:46hrs 23/12/2009] - http://fora.tv/2008/09/10/Egypt_Today_State_of_Human_Rights#chapter_03
Peres S. (2009) World Economic Forum [Accessed 21:09hrs 22/12/2009] - (40 min 45 sec) - www.youtube.com/watch?v=cR4zRbPy2kY
Said E. (1978) Orientalism – Vintage Publications
Schumpeter J. (1994) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (pp 251) - Routledge Publications
United Nations (1945) United Nations Charter [Accessed 19:37hrs 21/12/2009] – http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/
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Morocco, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Oman, Yemen.
Aims of this Blogspot
The Middle East has been a focal point of study in the West for centuries. Our fascination and indeed domination mainly began with the Christian Crusades almost a millenium ago. Reinforced by Napolean's adventure (or mis-adventure as it turned out to be) into Egypt at the end of the 18th century, our awareness of the importance of this region has not gone away.
Through colonialism and interference by Western powers, the Middle East as we know it is on the one hand an ever-changing region, whereas on the other hand it seemingly never does. Whether a by-product of colonialism, neocolonialism, realism and hegemony, or whether an inate "Arabness" which causes the mutitude of problems has been debated ad nauseum. Nevertheless, there is still room to argue this issue, and the many others. This Blog will do just that.
I am not a "Chomskyite", nor do I support Netanyahu. I take each thing in context - the wider context that is - when I attempt to analyse and discuss the Middle East. The aim of this blog is to inform, and often to persuade, however is not based on religious or political doctrine, but based on a moral code. As Robert Fisk so aptly points out, commentators on the Middle East should take sides. That side however should be determined by morality over epistemology or political persuasion.
This reasoning will therefore be utilised when I discuss the Middle East. I will begin with an overview of the vexed problem of democracy in the Middle East. I would invite other views on what is one of the most fundamental challenges facing the region.
Through colonialism and interference by Western powers, the Middle East as we know it is on the one hand an ever-changing region, whereas on the other hand it seemingly never does. Whether a by-product of colonialism, neocolonialism, realism and hegemony, or whether an inate "Arabness" which causes the mutitude of problems has been debated ad nauseum. Nevertheless, there is still room to argue this issue, and the many others. This Blog will do just that.
I am not a "Chomskyite", nor do I support Netanyahu. I take each thing in context - the wider context that is - when I attempt to analyse and discuss the Middle East. The aim of this blog is to inform, and often to persuade, however is not based on religious or political doctrine, but based on a moral code. As Robert Fisk so aptly points out, commentators on the Middle East should take sides. That side however should be determined by morality over epistemology or political persuasion.
This reasoning will therefore be utilised when I discuss the Middle East. I will begin with an overview of the vexed problem of democracy in the Middle East. I would invite other views on what is one of the most fundamental challenges facing the region.
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