Why was Pre-Islamic Arabia Known as the Age of Ignorance

In answering this question I believe that it is a primary requirement to examine the linguistic aspect of the term which the Islamic world now utilises to refer to the time of Pre-Islamic Arabia. The term jahiliyya is the word used. Broadly translated as the age of ignorance it is a word which connotes a lack of morality and reflects the tribal, lawless and often confused state of Pre-Islamic Arabia, one which was corrupted by “unbelief and hypocrisy” (Koran: 9.97). It is also of important note that the root letters in colloquial Iraqi dialect for example lend themselves to a meaning surrounding the idea of “infancy” or “children”. I would argue that this could act as a semantic analogy to the societal, sociological and religious nature of pre-Islamic Arabia when juxtaposed with the characteristics of that which followed.
During this essay I will attempt to describe the political systems (or lack thereof in most part) as well as the cultural and social features present before the rise of Islam. This in itself presents problems due to the lack of credible sources from the time, a view shared by Hitti (1937) and later by Brown (2003) who claims that understanding pre-Islamic society is “hobbled by a dearth of historical sources”. However, in spite of this, I will argue that the term Jahiliyya is applied to Pre-Islamic Arabia, not because of the ignorant nature of their societal structure or lack of religious cohesion per se, but simply because Islam follows a system a contrario to that which preceded it.

A key feature of Pre-Islamic Arabia is the lack of overall social cohesion which is probably a by-product of the nomadic lifestyle required for survival in a relatively inhospitable environment. Due to a distinct lack of overall authority as seen later with the Islamic ummah, and as a result a complete lack of common law, tribal law (which differed even from tribe to tribe) was the doctrine of order for the region. Although there were the “settled folk” (Hitti. 1937, pp. 23) they did not introduce a common law, to which the masses, both settled and nomadic followed. As a result, tribes were rather Machiavellian in nature and conducted raids on neighbouring tribes as a means to gain wealth and prominence in a particular geographical area. Raiding was seen as an essential way of life for tribes and as the pre-Islamic poet Qatami writes “our business is to make raids on the enemy, on our neighbour and on our brother, in case we find none to raid but a brother” (Hitti. 1937, pp. 25). The inevitable consequence to such a way of life as quite sharply described by Qatami was that of an almost constant state of local conflicts often lasting years. However, this state of constant anarchy underpinned what was in essence a rich and diverse culture.

The introduction of Islam to this region saw a fundamental shift in religious practices. The advent of Islam preached the basic premise of monotheistic worship which was in direct contrast to that seen previously. Polytheism and fetishist worship was the religious mainstay of the region. This was however not without foundation, and as Berkey (2003) suggests, Pre-Islamic Arabia and surrounding regions had religious practices which were interconnected rather than specifically different. There also existed the belief of the ‘Supreme Being’ (Brelich 1958). However, worship and religious practices of this kind, that of deification of individuals and ascribing divine properties to idols was countered by the rise of Islam. Indeed, the Koran clearly states that the practice of polytheism (and moreover animism and fetishism) caused the community to be “without Light” (Al-Nur, 24:40). It is evident that with such a vehement opposition to polytheism as a core difference between that of Islam (indeed the first pillar of Islam is the testament that there is no god but Allah) it is clear that there is deep criticism of the pre-Islamic times. However, although there was deep seated idol worship throughout this age, this was not the fabric of society; that is to say, this did not provide a moral framework to maintain societal cohesion. Societal cohesion was a concept which on a broader scale was unnecessary for the survival of the tribe. However, the Arabian Peninsula was an important trading route and so with a dearth of religious guidance in the form of Islam, the area was sporadically controlled by tribal law. This provided the framework for justice in the region, and moreover was common law by which all tribal members must follow. This inevitably led to a tribal loyalty and a sense of belonging governing individual’s actions rather than that of divine law. This notion is firmly supported by Hitti (1937, pp. 26) who states that “no worse calamity could befall a Bedouin than to lose his tribal affiliation”.

However, it is important to note a few basic features of the region to understand the broader picture. Firstly the area was a trading route rather that a major producer of goods. It was a rather inhospitable place with little resources and despite being surrounded by two major superpowers, the Byzantine and Sassanid empires it was not invaded (Hitti. 1937) An exception to this may be that of a minor proxy war between the two regional giants in the form of a incursion and subsequent relinquishment of territory in Yemen in the 6th century, which saw the Byzantine backed Axum invade areas in the Himyarite Yemen, only to be ousted by a Sasanian backed force (Espositio, 1999). The fact that there were two major superpowers also meant that there was never the temptation for expansionism on the part of the Arabs. This of course would have required a much more developed system to organise, rather than a loosely connected group of tribes. Indeed, the status quo at the time was acceptable for the requirements of daily life. Moreover, being different to the system of Islam which followed it, this societal modus operandi, although interspersed with many localised conflicts, functioned to meet its requirements. Furthermore, Mecca prospered as a trade centre. However, with the rise of Islam, and subsequent spread, imposing wider common laws required infrastructure, which in turn required financing. Following the Prophet’s demise his successors embarked on policies of expansionism, driven by the word of God and the desire to spread Islam. This is a starkly contrasting situation to that seen previously, where expansion and dominance of others was confined to very much local regions. This then leads to the inevitable question of whether the term Jahiliyya is a fair reflection of the times preceding Islam, considering the difference in ambition between the two eras.

It has been established that Pre-Islamic times were driven by tribal law and doctrine, and the aims of these laws and doctrine were limited to survival, indeed Holt., et al (1970, pp. 3) assert that “His [the bedouin] life is a competitive struggle for existence”. Additionally, accrual of wealth was done so in a much more localised manner through ghazw or raiding. There did not exist the need or desire for expansion and these laws were functional within the given context. However, I firmly assert that the term ascribed to this time as the age of ignorance is to a degree unfairly justified simply due to its juxtaposition with the guidance provided by Islam. Although the literal meaning points towards a lack of social morality without guidance from God, it most definitely holds connotations which are deeply critical. Of course by modern standards and arguably by the standards which immediately followed, that of an Islam in its infancy, the tribal order witnessed in pre-Islamic Arabia was indeed barbaric to an extent. However, it was workable, yet receives vociferous condemnation within the Koran.

For example, Surah Al-Isra 17:31 and Surah Al-Anam 6:151 discuss the topic of female infanticide, and specifically condemn it as un-Islamic. However, although the epitome of barbarism, female infanticide was a common practice within pre-Islamic Arabia. But again, one is inclined to view this practice in such a way which neglects the wider context. If one reiterates the limited requirements of the time, that of survival, then although this practice was barbarous, it was a necessary evil for prosperity. Islam very much improved the rights of women, however, female infanticide is still widely practiced even in modern times throughout the Middle East, mainly for economic security (Gendercide case study Feb 2004). This practice alone shows that even with moral or divine guidance, the desire for survival and prosperity surpasses the need to adhere to Islamic teachings.

Indeed, I am inclined to suggest that the obstreperous criticisms of pre-Islamic practices, be them religious or societal are to a degree ethnocentric. The Koran implies that the behaviour displayed throughout the period of Jahiliyya was epitomised by brutality, barbarism and nefariousness due to a lack of moral guidance. “Whomever GOD deprives of light, will have no light” (Al-Nur 24:40) infers the notion of before (in darkness) and after. However, although this may be true by today’s standards (and one must question whether this is indeed a truism) it is possibly not so worthy of such staunch criticism when contextualised to encompass the limited requirements for a divine guidance at that time.

References
Berkey J. (2003) The Formation of Islam – Religion and Society in the Near East, 600-1800. Cambridge University Press.
Brelich A. (1958) Gli eroi greci. University of Rome Publications
Esposito J. (1999) Oxford History of Islam. Oxford University Press.
Gendercide (Feb 2004) Gendercide Watch Case Study: Female Infanticide. Youth Advocate Program (www.yapi.org/girlchild/)
Hitti P. (1937) History of the Arabs. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave.
Holt P., et al (1970) The Cambridge History of Islam, Volume 1. Cambridge University Press.
Koran – Al- Tawba (9:97), Al-Nur (24:40), Al-Isra (17:31), Al-Anam (6:151).