What is the Problem with Democracy in the Middle East?

The concept of democracy in the Middle East has been a topic of discussion which has plagued academics for decades. The region itself is infinitely complex and aside from the very term “Middle East” being hugely controversial, the notion of democracy too is also incredibly capacious. During this essay I will be addressing the first two issues. This will require a degree of necessary generalisation. However, this does not serve to legitimise my arguments which would otherwise be undermined by more expanded explanations, but rather acts as a more simplistic platform on which to base them. Once this basis for discussion has been created it will enable me to present the argument that a multitude of factors have prevented the Middle East from adopting a democratic paradigm. I will argue that internal factors such as historical reluctance for change, unstable social, religious and economic features of the region have, as of now, been somewhat incompatible with democracy. Moreover, foreign policy displayed by external state actors (mainly that of the US), has also served to undermine the introduction of democracy in the region. This also presents the argument that although ostensibly engaging in a process of democracy promotion, the US has in truth adopted a realist approach to the Middle East and often supported undemocratic regimes to realise its own agenda.

It is first necessary to establish what exactly is meant by the term “Middle East”. This term was coined by an American naval officer Alfred Mahan in 1902. It is used to refer to the area previously known as the “Orient” and encompasses a vast region, including North Africa, the Levant region and the Arabian Peninsula, stopping at Iran which is often referred to as Persia. Moreover, some would even include Afghanistan, India and Pakistan. For the purposes of this essay I will make reference to the Middle East as being that region which would generally consider itself to be Arab, and which is united by common language, stretching from Morocco, across North Africa and into Arabia. Although not united by a shared language or Arab identity, I will also be including Iran and Israel in this term due to their geographical location and high importance in the region. This term will therefore refer to 19 countries.[1]

Nonetheless, applying the term “Middle East” to these countries is not done so lightly. It is applied with consideration for thinkers such as the late Edward Said, who argued that referring to the region as one monolithic and homogeneous body is done so with utter ignorance. In his seminal book ‘Orientalism’ (1978), Said argues that this term is not only ethnocentric – what is the Middle East the middle of? – but also asserts that each country has incredible differences in language, culture, religion, history and ethnology. Although these factors must therefore be taken into serious consideration when discussing the applicability of democracy in the Middle East, Said’s strong rhetoric will be respected selectively. His views have undoubtedly brought about a vast change in the approach to the Middle East however I find elements of his discourse too forceful. There is the requirement to study this complex region and to do so without considering his ideas would be counter-productive. Conjointly however, to approach the subject with unquestioning acceptance of his proposals would also be somewhat unproductive.
Secondly it is fundamentally necessary to establish what is meant when we discuss democracy. This in itself is incredibly complicated and so I will adopt the proposals by Schumpeter (1994) who reduced this concept to a single sentence – “The Common Good and the Will of the People”. If we analyse in more depth the meaning of this then we are faced with not simply an election between multiple candidates (although political pluralism is of course vital) but more a common consensus about the approach state leaders make with regards political decision making. Schumpeter alludes to those in power, who must implement the good will of the people. Furthermore he asserts that the official position of all cabinet ministers “is that in all departments the will of the people prevails”. However, he is also astute in noting the shortcomings of this system in that the elected representative is also unable to realise the will of all of his constituents. (pp 251).

To discuss the concept of democracy in the Middle East is far from easy. If I generalise that democracy is the will of the common people realised by appointed officials who hold that position via free and fair elections then this will be too vague. Shimon Peres, whilst speaking during the World Economic Forum in 2009, firmly voiced his view on the qualitative values of a democratic model. Speaking somewhat out of character he passionately laid out his firm beliefs regarding this system. He ardently asserted that democracy is not just “about one day of elections every four years.” He says that after the elections, acts of violence are not justified simply because they are carried out by a democratically elected authority (Hamas being the inferred party guilty of such abuses). He furthers his argument with the suggestion that democracy is a “Civilisation”. These are incredibly profound words. He is suggesting that democracy is not simply a system of free and fair elections, but that this system must provide freedom and fairness in all aspects of life, for example, human rights, civil liberties and freedom of press etc. Although there is no mention of the word ‘democracy’, this is most definitely inferred by the United Nations Charter. So aside from the “one day in four years”, democracy is a way of life. I would agree in most part to his suggestions and so this is the platform from which I will address its application to the Middle East.

Historically speaking, the Middle East as we know it is in its infancy since it was ruled by the Ottoman Empire. However, following lengthy periods of colonial occupation and subsequent status as mandated territories, by 1971, all countries had established independence (Milton-Edwards, 2006). Since this independence, the often volatile region has seen huge shifts in political rule. Indeed, in eleven countries of the nineteen, there have been twenty one coups since World War Two. Contemporarily, Freedom House, an American independent NGO which promotes freedom worldwide, compiled their latest report, the findings of which place all nineteen countries as being not free, or partly free; the overwhelming majority the former(Freedom in the World, 2009). There are a significant number of reasons which lead to this lack of freedom. For example, many would argue that the dominant religion for this region is incompatible with the democratic system. Although there is a degree of truth to this statement, it is somewhat sweeping and must be scrutinised.

Firstly, Islam is a religion which focuses on the unaltered worship of God. He is considered by followers to be the sovereign of all men on Earth. This fundamental belief held by Muslims is intrinsic to understanding why the process of democracy may not be easily applied to this region. If God is the unequivocal voice on how all men should act, then it removes the right of adherents to make their own decisions regarding many aspects of their way of life. However, this methodology does not explain the varying degrees of freedom in the differing countries throughout the Middle East. For example, despite being a lower-developed country, Yemen is described as being a “partly free” nation by Freedom House. Yemen is similar in religious terms to its much more developed neighbour Oman, which is described as being “not free”. Yemen however is a theocracy, whereas Oman is not. To find the explanation for this discrepancy in the assumption that Islamic theology is incompatible with democracy, one must look at the difference in religious interpretation.

Whilst God’s law is considered to be ‘uncorrupted’, there is the need for its implementation on Earth by a legislative body. To that end, I would suggest that the problem in adopting democracy simply due to religion is not a valid argument. If the public wish for a legislator who will impose the will of God on the masses, then there is no reason why this cannot be done so with a democratic model. This is a view shared by El Fadl (2004) who suggests that God gave “considerable latitude” to humans in governing themselves, and that the Koran simply preaches a “minimum moral standard” by which Muslims must follow. This suggestion is important in that if humans may interpret what these moral codes are, and the political approach to imposing them, then this therefore leaves room for a democratic paradigm. This of course would explain the difference of civil freedoms outlined by the Freedom House survey for 2009. However, if one further investigates this, it becomes clear that whilst theoretically this may be possible, this approach would still retain religious restrictions. The masses may vote for hardline Islamic governments, or they may elect more moderate governments in democratic elections. Nevertheless, the values proposed by God as the overarching sovereign are still adopted in policy making (particularly regarding the rule of law). It would therefore be, by default, only ever possible to apply at best a ‘quasi- democratic’ system.

Whilst this is true for the majority of states throughout the region, it is not necessarily a truism for all. Iraq is a country with an extreme history of undemocratic rule. Following independence in 1932, the country saw its ubiquitous number of incidents of coups and political unrest. The result of the chaos was the leadership of Saddam Hussein. During a twenty year rule, democracy was an unthinkable possibility under his dictatorship. However, Saddam secularised the government and all laws were not based on the doctrine laid out by the Koran. One would therefore assume that freedom from a religious code would make this a more liberal state. This of course was not the case, and Saddam became adept at political censorship and brutality. Indeed, to further complicate matters, theocratic countries also often utilise their position of power to oppress the masses. The first example of theocratic rule in Yemen is representative of this. In spite of its comparably favourable score in regards to freedom, Yemen still attracted vociferous criticism by the organisation “Human Rights Watch”. Yemen was described as being marred by “arbitrary arrests and disappearances” (HRW World Report 2009). The lack of democracy in both secular and religious states therefore leads me to the conclusion that although in some respects Islam holds several key concepts which may conflict with this paradigm, it does not play as significant a role as many would argue.

An alternative reason for the lack of democracy in the region encompasses the opposition view to Edward Said. He suggested that the West harbours deep seated suspicion to those countries to its East. Rudyard Kipling once wrote “East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet”. Whilst this cliché is very broad, Buruma & Avishahi (Occidentalism, 2002) assert that the East’s view of Western political ideal, i.e. democracy, is that it is somewhat destructive and often associated with political hegemony. Such deep seated suspicion of the West by the Middle East makes the introduction of a political model developed and promoted by the “other” incredibly difficult from the outset. However, I would suggest that although there has traditionally been a suspicious attitude from that of the East towards the West, this does not serve as comprehensive reasoning behind the reluctance to embrace the democratic model. Indeed, many throughout the Middle East do rebel against oppression and hold the higher values ascribed to democracy such as freedom of speech as preeminent requirements to liberty in their lives. An example of this would be the recent increase in civil non-violent protest in Egypt (Lynch 2008). Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that many of the state systems in place suffer from historical hangovers which are a by-product of colonialism. Although not comprehensive in explaining major drawbacks to such political typologies, it is a fact acknowledged by Milton-Edwards (2006), who suggests that “the political traditions are not indigenous to the region” and are a “product of foreign domination”. Although holding a degree of truth, I would assert that the legacy left by colonial powers has, in contemporary political life, only served as a minimal influencing factor to prevent democracy growth.

However, the theory of internal barriers to democracy acceptance only paints part of the picture. The term “democracy acceptance” is not used accidentally. It implies that where there is acceptance, or lack thereof, there is proposal. This proposal is clearly manifested in US foreign policy. Historically, the US had always taken the approach of cooperation with states in the Middle East in order to meet their own agenda. There was a reluctance to interfere with internal policies provided that they did not significantly interfere with the US interests for that specific state. With the exceptions of often volatile relationships with Saddam Hussein’s regime and post-revolution Iran, the US cooperated with “undemocratic and autocratic” governments (HoC 2006). This was mainly for the security of energy requirements. A key piece of evidence to support this claim is the intimate relationship between the US and a very undemocratic Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is the largest oil producing nation and the US is the biggest consumer. Close diplomatic and economic ties with Saudi Arabia ensured this relationship and therefore the energy deals remained mutually beneficial. Relationships of this ilk, although not considered as close, were also maintained with Iran prior to the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Iran, ruled by the Shah was also undemocratic. However, in acts which became synonymous with US double standards, the Shah seized power in a CIA backed military coup of 1953 which ousted a democratically elected leader in Mossadegh (Hornberger 2005). The Shah was seen as pro-US and so was a much more attractive candidate in the eyes of the USA to safeguard the third largest oil reserve in the world. During the Iranian Revolution some 25 years later, the Shah was again backed by the US – in spite of huge numbers of Iranians supporting his opposition. The realist approach to this region displayed by the US has been a feature of their foreign policy for decades. However, a fresh approach in the form of George W Bush would apparently aim to end tyranny, ostensibly at the cost of US interests.

With the benefit of history, to understand US foreign policy in the Middle East, a comparison should be made with the democratisation of South America. This was done so with US backing (and military intervention). Indeed the US utilised a combination of hard and soft power, mainly the former, to achieve stable economies from which a number of democracies grew. Chile is an example cited by the economist Robert E. Looney (2005) to this end. A series of terrorist attacks as well as instability and volatility between the US and the oil giants of Iran and Iraq, led the US to decide to adapt long established US foreign policy to that of democracy promotion. Speciously, this approach would have been mutually beneficial – “a democratic world is a more peaceful world” (Haass 2002).The Bush administration’s increased intentions for democracy promotion utilised hard power against Iran and Iraq, to achieve this aim. The intervention in Iraq however attracts the most criticism. The naive reasoning of WMD, and then of links to terror, both of which remain unproven, served to undermine the legitimacy of the new approach. The retrospective party line from the Administration then alluded to democracy promotion to improve the lives of Iraqis. I am inclined to be incredibly sceptical for numerous reasons.
History has shown that US foreign policy is either realist or protectionist in nature. Moreover, the example cited earlier in the case of Iran serves to demonstrate that policies always favour US interests often at the expense of the masses – in the case of the Middle East, the main interest is energy security. Further evidence is realised when one compares the policies, and the deplorable intervention in Iraq with the approach taken with another oppressive regime – that of Saudi Arabia. In spite of the attacks of September 11th being heavily linked with Saudi Arabia (Not only does Osama Bin Laden hail from this country but also most of the Hijackers were Saudi too), the US were quick to show their support for the Saudi Royal Family. However, one would assume that the lack of democratic process as well as an increasing problem of Islamic extremism would provoke vociferous condemnation from the US for a country which is described as “not free” by the Freedom House survey (2009). Indeed, Human Rights Watch also described it as displaying behaviour which invokes “serious concerns” (HRW 2009) regarding human rights. However, aside from gentle rhetoric from the Whitehouse, which had little or no impact in promoting democracy, the Bush administration were unsurprisingly reserved in their approach. This moral double standard has been further displayed with the case of Egypt (again described as “not free”) where the regime in place were supported by the US Administration, and the opposition party of the Muslim Brotherhood were silenced by means of over-bureaucratisation and arbitrary detention during recent election periods. (Lynch 2008).

On reflection, the US foreign policy of democracy promotion is clearly selective. The states which received strong condemnation, sanctions, or indeed invasion, are those states (most notably Iran and Iraq) which had poor diplomatic ties with the US. Nations which are arguably as undemocratic but which hold energy resources and maintain diplomatic ties, such as Saudi Arabia or UAE, do not receive the same level of “help” in achieving democracy. Moreover, many of the oppressive regimes themselves receive US backing. The problem of promoting balanced democracy for each state in this region from the perspective of the US appears to be that when parties are elected which are “unacceptable” (HoC 2006 - when referring to the election of Hamas), simply speaking, the US may not get what it wishes for. I would therefore suggest that the US policy for democracy promotion is mainly an empty rhetoric which is marred by transparent double standards to satisfy its thirst for control in the region and ergo its oil reserves.

Although there is mountainous evidence to support such claims, it would be premature to make conclusive assumptions without consideration of evidence in defence of US foreign policy. This is in relation to rentier states prior to the attacks of September 11. Many of the GCC countries were offered financial assistance to be used for the promotion of democracy. However, most refused, and even the possible exception in the newly liberated Kuwait in 1991 soon realised that its reliance on the US for security against the Iraqi regime was outweighed by a growing sense of self confidence, backed by huge oil reserves. Kuwait, along with every other autocratic GCC country refused the carefully weighted pressure and negligible financial support from the US backed International Republican Institute. Nevertheless, it is widely acknowledged that in spite of this half-hearted coaxing, the US still favoured the status quo in most of the nations in that region. (Brown & Shahin 2009)

The naive attempts by the US in Iraq demonstrate how this complex region may not yet be ready for democracy. Simon Bromley (1994) clearly lays out preconditions for democracy, two defining features of which are the instigation of a capitalist economic model and privatisation of industry (mainly affecting rentier states). These prerequisites alone are not present in this region and are unlikely to be in the foreseeable future. Additionally, the aforementioned internal challenges faced by most states in the region also serve to at least slow down democratisation, and some would argue that they form a solid barrier to its growth. More strongly, I would argue that democracy cannot be introduced, but rather is simply a by-product borne of changing religious, social and economic pretexts present in the state. Moreover, it is a process which takes significant time as well as the cooperation of those already in power, who of course would have a vested interest in denying a fully democratic system. To attempt introduce democracy instantly, without such changes, would be tantamount to introducing a maimed zebra to a lioness, the consequences of which are clearly being demonstrated by the ongoing abomination in Iraq.


Timothy Reece






References & Bibliography

Bromley S. (1994) Rethinking Middle East Politics – Polity Press in Association with Blackwell Publishers
Brown J. & Shahin E. (2009) The Struggle over Democracy in the Middle East (pp 18-20) – Routledge Publications
Buruma I. & Avishahi A. (2004) Occidentalism – The West in the Eyes of its Enemies – Penguin Press
Milton-Edwards B. (2006) Contemporary Politics in the Middle East: Second Ed. – Polity Press
El Fadl K. (2004) Islam and the Challenge of Democracy – Princeton University Press
Freedom House (2009) Freedom in the World – Setbacks and Resilience [Accessed 22:48hrs 27/12/2009] - http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw09/MOF09_MENA.pdf http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=445
Haass R. (2002) Research Paper 06/54 – Democracy and the Middle East (pp 9) - House of Commons Library
Hornberger J. (2005) An Anti-Democracy Foreign Policy Plan: Iran – Future Freedom Foundation
House of Commons (2006) Research Paper 06/54 – Democracy and the Middle East (pp 1-12) - House of Commons Library
Human Rights Watch (2009) Human Rights Watch World Report 2009 (Saudi Arabia) [Accessed 17:55hrs 26/12/2009] - http://www.hrw.org/en/node/79258
Human Rights Watch (2009) Human Rights Watch World Report 2009 (Yemen) [Accessed 14:42hrs 26/12/2009] - http://www.hrw.org/en/node/79308
Lynch M. (2006) Project on Middle East Democracy – Egypt Today: The State of Human Rights (Part 3) [Accessed 15:46hrs 23/12/2009] - http://fora.tv/2008/09/10/Egypt_Today_State_of_Human_Rights#chapter_03
Peres S. (2009) World Economic Forum [Accessed 21:09hrs 22/12/2009] - (40 min 45 sec) - www.youtube.com/watch?v=cR4zRbPy2kY
Said E. (1978) Orientalism – Vintage Publications
Schumpeter J. (1994) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (pp 251) - Routledge Publications
United Nations (1945) United Nations Charter [Accessed 19:37hrs 21/12/2009] – http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/


[1]
Morocco, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Oman, Yemen.